


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DISARMAMENT IN PERSPECTIVE: AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ARMS CONTROL  
AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS, 1919-1939.  
VOLUME IV. CONCLUSIONS

California State College Foundation  
Los Angeles, California

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DISARMAMENT IN PERSPECTIVE:

An Analysis of Selected Arms Control and Disarmament  
Agreements Between the World Wars, 1919-1939

VOLUME IV

CONCLUSIONS

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THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

PREPARED BY

CALIFORNIA STATE COLLEGE AT LOS ANGELES FOUNDATION

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26

→ ~~TABLE OF CONTENTS~~

Volume IV CONCLUSIONS

Chapter 21 <u>Factors Affecting Arms Control, 1919-39</u>	1
<u>Origins of Arms Control Proposals,</u>	4
<u>The Negotiatory Process,</u>	10
<u>Verification and Control,</u>	15
<u>Compliance and Revision, and</u>	20
<u>Arms Control and Security.</u>	24
Index	30

## Chapter 21

FACTORS AFFECTING ARMS CONTROL, 1919-39

Drawing conclusions from arms control and disarmament agreements as varied as these under study is a hazardous undertaking. Those historical "lessons" which are easily identifiable have long been obvious to even the most casual student of arms control, while those which are more elusive are, unfortunately, conditioned by uniquenesses which inhibit generalization. One analyst has suggested, for example, that "Naval limitation, like Prohibition, was a 'noble experiment' which failed."<sup>1</sup> That the naval treaties of 1920s and 1930s failed to prevent World War Two is beyond challenge; but does this mean that all interwar naval limitation efforts were of no value? Surely an assessment this harsh would be difficult to sustain. Perhaps the truest statement that can be made about the interwar arms control pacts is that, singly or collectively, they can be used to provide historical precedent for nearly any sophisticated argument one chooses to advance.

Between 1919 and 1939, two basic methods of regulating armaments were employed: geographic demilitarization and arms limitation. As a matter of general definition, demilitarization denotes a geographically defined zone from which military forces and weapons have been withdrawn and are not to be reintroduced; while arms limitation means the limitation and, occasionally, reduction of military personnel and weapons to specified levels and the maintaining of these levels over a stipulated period of time. These two methods are not mutually exclusive, however, for both might be found in the same agreement.

With considerable historical precedent to recommend it, geographical demilitarization was designed to reduce friction between nations by the removal of weapons and fortifications from areas of potential hostile confrontation. The Russo-Finnish treaty provided the broadest use of this method

by restricting Finnish naval and air forces along its Arctic Coast, by prohibiting Finnish military bases on stipulated islands in the Gulf of Finland, and by removing or prohibiting "military establishments or armaments" of both parties in specified areas along the Soviet-Finnish frontier. This pact demonstrated the versatility of geographic demilitarization by its application to oceanic and land frontiers, to islands and lakes, and by its injunctions against military bases, fortifications, artillery, radio transmitters, warships, submarines, and military aircraft within these specified areas.

Other agreements employing demilitarization as a means of reducing international friction included the Lausanne treaty, the Spitsbergen pact and the Aland Island convention. At Lausanne it was agreed to create a zone free from fortifications or military forces along the West Thracian frontier bordering Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria, to remove armaments from stipulated Greek and Turkish islands in the Aegean Sea, and to dismantle Turkish military installations along the Straits. In the case of Spitsbergen, the arms control provisions were limited only to defortification; in the Aland Island convention arms control measures went beyond the razing of fortifications and established a broad system of demilitarization.

Arms limitation agreements focused on quantitative and qualitative restrictions of armament technology, that is, they sought to reduce international tensions (i.e., prevent arms races) by limiting the numbers and types of weapons. The Washington naval "system" and the military prohibitions applied to the vanquished Central Powers comprised the widest use of this technique. At Versailles the Allies worked out an elaborate program--using both quantitative and qualitative measures--for restricting Germany's armed forces, including the limitation of personnel and equipment to stipulated ceilings for the army and navy, the prohibition of military aircraft, submarines, tanks and heavy artillery, and the regulation of industry engaged in producing war material. The Washington treaty (1922), the London treaty (1930), and the Anglo-German pact (1935) stressed a quantitative method of naval limitation which employed ratios to compute numbers of vessels and total tonnages by classes. The London treaty (1936) emphasized qualitative restrictions on warship design, vessel tonnage, and size of armaments. While the agreements primarily concerned with quantitative measures also utilized many qualitative provisions, these two techniques did offer

alternative methods to regulate naval armaments.

The Turko-Greek protocol (1930) and the Turko-Soviet protocol (1931) employed yet another approach to naval limitation. Faced with the near impossibility of computing ratios--as their types of vessels and sea frontiers differed enormously--these nations used a simple letter of intent. They were to notify the other party six months prior to laying down or placing an order for a new warship.

That arms limitation measures were compatible with geographic demilitarization techniques was borne out in both the Washington naval treaty and the treaties imposed upon the Central Powers. The naval accords of 1922 prohibited the construction of additional fortifications or military and naval installations in a designated Central Pacific zone embracing the Philippine Islands and the Japanese Mandates. The Allies demanded in the Versailles treaty the demilitarization of specific areas including the Rhineland, the Saar, Heligoland, the Baltic Channels and Germany's North Sea Coast. In both cases, demilitarization was complimentary to the principal function of the treaties--to limit and reduce armament.

Two other agreements under study here do not fit into these arbitrary classifications; the armistices of 1918 and the rules of submarine warfare which culminated in the proces-verbal of 1936. The armistices embodied both demilitarization and arms limitations but in different fashion from the other treaties. For example, the German armistice called for the withdrawal of military personnel from stipulated areas but not for the general neutralization of these regions; it provided for the reduction of German armament but not for specific limitations. Rules governing submarine warfare were formulated in an effort to define the combat activities of underwater hostilities; it restricted the submarine's attack of unarmed merchant ships but left uninhibited its use against warships.

Despite the acknowledged hazards involved in generalizing, a number of observations were suggested during the analysis of the interwar arms control agreements. These points have been grouped under five categories entitled the "Origins of Arms Control Proposals," "The Negotiatory Process," "Verification and Control," "Compliance and Revision," and "Arms Control and Security."

Origins of Arms Control Proposals

Examination of the factors which prompted the negotiation of treaties containing arms control and disarmament provisions poses at least two fundamental questions. Where in the policy-making process did the idea of invoking these provisions originate? And for what reasons? The answer requires probing of national motivation at several levels, the most immediate aspect of which is consideration of policy priorities.

First, certain proposals were initiated as high-priority policies with specific, clearly perceived, arms limitation and disarmament objectives. This was demonstrated in the proceedings leading to the naval agreements--Turko-Greek and the Turko-Soviet pacts. Although policy commitments are evident in each instance, the motivational origins of the arms control and disarmament priorities are more difficult to establish. Prominent among several considerations figuring in the advancement of these priorities were "economic" and "political" factors. Economic motivation stemmed from a desire to reduce or stabilize armament expenditures and, thus, protect the domestic economy of the contending states. Political factors, which complemented other considerations, included concern with national security, outstanding national issues which might be aggravated by mounting political tensions over armament policies, and the hopes of various national publics to avoid war.

Governmental policies designed to reduce or stabilize military forces or armaments were usually articulated in terms of potential injury to the national economy. This did not necessarily mean that the economy was unable to bear the expenditure, rather it often meant that if armaments were to be given primacy in national priorities other highly desirable domestic programs must be curtailed or taxes must be increased. In the highly political matter of determining national priorities, economic and political factors were often closely intertwined. In his analysis of the 1930 London naval treaty, Lord Chatfield complained that the pact "was a capitulation by the Admiralty to political force majeure; they were defeated by the Foreign Office and the Treasury."<sup>2</sup>

Economic pressures were most evident in the origins of the Washington naval system and in the formation of the Near Eastern naval protocols. The threat of naval competition in

1919-1921 between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan posed each government the prospect of an unwelcomed drain of its resources. While in strictly economic terms America might be little injured by such a contest, the other two major seapowers were in less advantageous positions. Britain had just concluded a war which had caused an unprecedented drain on its national wealth and it would have to make extensive sacrifices to engage in a new armaments race. Japan just did not appear to have the basic resources or the national economy to compete with the Anglo-Saxon nations in the building of costly warships.

If the United States possessed the economic resources to overwhelm any competition in naval armaments, neither its leadership nor its citizenry desired to engage in such a contest. Americans of greatly differing political persuasions, ranging from pacifists to ultranationalists, from liberals to reactionaries, were agreed as to the economic waste of high armaments expenditures. The same conclusions were drawn by the majority of British leaders and their war-weary citizens. While the Japanese government's attitude was more reserved, plainly neither it nor its citizens desired a costly naval race. Consequently, all three nations looked to naval limitation as a substitute for arms competition and they made naval limitation high-priority policy.

Economic considerations also moved Greece and Turkey to reconcile their long-standing disputes over territorial claims and treatment of minority populations in order to prevent an armament race in the Aegean Sea. Neither country felt it had the resources to engage in such competition and, subsequently, each consciously accepted the idea of naval limitation as national policy. Motivated much in the same fashion, the Turks and Russians also came to terms regarding naval forces in the Black Sea.

Naval limitation treaties failed when one of the signatories placed ambition for empire above those of economy. This was evident when Japan chose to abandon the Washington naval system in the 1930s because its leaders thought, probably correctly, such restrictions might impair their mounting desire for empire. Russia, too, abrogated its pact with Turkey in 1945 when its desire for political aggrandizement overrode its concern for economy.

Historically, naval limitation has been prompted by a desire to stabilize or reduce national expenditure for



armaments. A close examination of the Rush-Bagot agreement (1817) and the Argentine-Chile protocol (1902), as well as the naval pacts of the 1920s and 1930s, sprang from similar conscious national policies. In each instance, one of the readily identifiable factors motivating the negotiations for control of naval armaments has been concern with the potential or actual drain on the national economy. Also in each instance, the governments making limitation a policy goal were concerned with a basically defensive national strategy. Certainly the evidence seems to indicate that economic self-interest has been at least as dominant, if not more so, as the desire for "peace" in the development of arms control mechanisms to limit naval forces.

Public opinion ranked high among the political considerations which underlay the establishment of disarmament and arms control measures as high-priority national policies. This popular sentiment was obviously a mixed bag: it was the product of pacifism, of political isolationism and of economic considerations. In the democracies, public endorsement of disarmament (i.e., arms limitation) as a substitute for armaments to provide for national security not only made such policies politically feasible, it even required statesmen to advance these concepts after such policies became questionable in light of international realities.

Pacifism and a desire for peace (personal commitments which may vary in intensity) provided much of the motivation required to move the governments of the United States, Great Britain and Japan--perhaps also those of France and Italy--to initiate and respond to the call for naval limitation at Washington in 1922. While this same popular sentiment continued to influence the thrust of the Washington naval system during the 1920s and 1930s, it did so in quite dissimilar ways. In the United States, public opinion encouraged national leadership to ignore the fact that the fleet was below treaty limits; in fact, this sentiment solidified around the policy of naval reduction so intensely that it became politically difficult to begin rearmament even when no treaty was possible. Thus during the 1935-1936 negotiations, the American government possessed no policy alternatives with which to compel Japan to reconsider the treaty system; more public flexibility might have allowed the Roosevelt administration to threaten Japan with an active renewal of naval competition if they persisted with their policy of abrogation. British public opinion became afflicted with the same rigidity regarding disarmament

generally and naval limitation in particular. In France, the government effectively curbed the "peace sentiment" for disarmament by constantly holding up the threatening specter of an angry, resurgent German aggressiveness; consequently the Washington treaty was the only mutually binding arms limitation agreement Paris ratified during the interwar years. The Japanese militarists capitalized on Western racism, the threat of American domination of the Western Pacific, and the desire for empire in order to shift public opinion to oppose naval limitation.

Public opinion played a vital role both in the development and downfall of the naval limitation system. There is little question but popular support for naval limitation prodded statesmen to seriously consider this form of arms control. The evidence also clearly indicates that unreflective popular sentiment can impose severe restrictions on policy alternatives and that it can be remolded from a positive to a negative attitude toward peace through disarmament by a nationalist ideology which assumes the role of higher political value.

Naval limitation was also given a high priority in at least one instance because of a desire to advance other political ends. Following his unilateral abrogation of the Versailles military restrictions, Hitler consciously promoted the idea of an Anglo-German naval pact in order to end Germany's diplomatic isolation and to weaken Anglo-French cooperation. While Hitler had demanded military and naval "equality" with the other European states in March 1935, he quickly agreed to accept a bilateral accord which limited the German fleet to 35% of its British counterpart. And yet the cost was not great to Germany for given the extensive construction necessary to achieve military and naval parity, even without a treaty, it would be many years before German construction of warships would exceed the 35 per cent limit. Although British popular sentiment for arms limitation and reduction guaranteed public endorsement of the Anglo-German pact, national security motivated its consideration by London authorities. The origins of British interest in the naval pact with Hitler stemmed directly from the Admiralty which desired concrete information about German construction and which wished to prevent quantitative competition.

Finally, in assessing the nature of political motives leading to the establishment of arms control and disarmament as a distinct policy priority the evidence indicates that such initiatives usually stemmed from civil leaders rather than from military professionals. In each instance, with the exception of the British Admiralty's desire for the Anglo-German naval pact, the decision to endorse arms control and disarmament concept came from the civil members of the various governments.

Second, in other instances arms control proposals were advanced--during the course of negotiations dealing with complex political issues--as distinct elements to a broad compromise; in these cases, arms control measures were developed without extensive analysis and served as low-level policy alternatives. Examples of this order of policy development can be found in the Versailles treaty, the treaties imposed on the lesser Central Powers, the Russo-Finnish pact, and Spitsbergen agreement and the Lausanne convention. In these examples, the introduction of arms control techniques late in the structuring of policy objectives usually indicated the necessity for a broadly-based settlement embodying many ingredients--of which, the arms control provisions often, but not always, possessed the lesser significance. The idea of employing these provisions originated as a device of diplomacy; that is, the introduction of arms control concepts at this point was frequently suggested by a need to discover a satisfactory basis for compromise.

Where arms control mechanisms were developed as diplomatic necessities, both geographical demilitarization and arms limitation techniques were utilized. However when negotiations featured reciprocity rather than imposition, the favored mechanism was demilitarization--such as are found in the Russo-Finnish, Spitsbergen and Lausanne agreements. Demilitarization here was not developed until diplomacy called it forth as a basic element in a negotiated compromise.

Allied postwar plans for dealing with Turkey (the Ottoman Empire) did not consider demilitarization at all; indeed, this concept only gradually gained acceptance as a means of controlling Turkey generally and the Straits in particular. When demilitarization was introduced at the Lausanne conference it was to overcome rival territorial claims, while assuaging feelings of insecurity, and to assure free passage of commerce to the Black Sea. Because

of Spitsbergen's acknowledged strategic location, particularly its ideal location for a submarine base in the most navigable area of the Arctic, defortification (or "neutralization") was utilized to ease the disappointment and fears of those nations whose territorial claims were rejected. In the Russo-Finnish negotiations, demilitarization did not figure as a policy objective by either side; when it emerged it was to cement a compromise arrangement for the settling of rival territorial claims.

The introduction of arms control concepts at the close of the First World War--in the armistice and the peace treaties--is more difficult to classify. Its development appeared inspired by diplomatic improvisation and focused more extensively on arms limitation measures than geographic demilitarization. Disarmament never figured prominently in Allied war aims and even in 1918 the vague commitments suggested by the negotiations for the German armistice, under the 14 Points, implied reciprocal or mutual reductions of armed forces rather than disarmament by imposition. While the November 11 terms called for the surrender of weapons, for the internment of warships and airplanes, and for the military occupation of German territory, no integrated scheme of arms control was envisaged by the Armistice.

Allied domestic politics and contentious interallied policies prompted the imposition of German disarmament. Thus the origins of the military terms of the Versailles treaty, and those of the treaties imposed upon the other vanquished Central Powers, is to be found in the use of arms control mechanisms to achieve interallied political compromise. In this sense, arms control developed as a device of diplomatic necessity. Shortly after the Peace Conference opened, Lloyd George proposed the disarmament of Germany because to maintain a large Allied occupation force, as France was suggesting to keep Germany submissive, would require that England maintain peacetime conscription,--a policy that would unquestionably be very unpopular in England. It was, therefore, rather to appease the needs of British domestic politics, rather than to promote a long-range peace program, that arms control measures--both arms limitation and demilitarization--were insisted upon for Germany.

During the long negotiations over the future status of Germany's armed forces, political necessity (often expediency) ruled the decision-making process. Consequently, arms control formulas arrived at through diplomatic innovation,

rather than military considerations, frequently dictated the final terms.

### The Negotiatory Process

Many greatly different factors influenced the negotiatory process which shaped the arms control measures of the interwar decades. It is not easy, however, to define those characteristics which had general applicability. Most diplomatic undertakings featured, for example, multilateral or bilateral discussions with only those parties directly connected with the issues participating in the negotiations; yet there were two instances in which the decision-making process was "internationalized." In the case of the Spitsbergen convention the preliminary political and technical decisions were substantially formulated by the Paris Peace Conference despite the fact that neither Spitsbergen nor Norway, who claimed sovereignty over the region, had been belligerents in the First World War. The Aland Island agreement was a direct product of the efforts of the League of Nation's Council: the Council decided to intervene when the two parties most intimately involved (Sweden and Finland) appeared headed for an armed showdown.

The personality characteristics of individual diplomats ranked high among the intangible, unique factors which influenced negotiations. Occasionally, the purpose and dynamism of a single delegate was of the utmost significance: Charles Evans Hughes' dramatic opening address, for example, set the mood and established the tempo of the Washington naval conference. Also at the same conference, there was an unusual personal aspect of coincidence and importance: all three of the leading delegates, Hughes, Lord Balfour and Baron Kato were highly respected political figures in their own right and all three were concluding long, distinguished public careers. Given their individual desire to make the conference successful, these men not only accepted compromise, beyond their instructions, but persuaded their respective governments to endorse them. The intangible aspects of the negotiatory process were also reflected in Lord Curzon's resolute direction, and Ismet Pasha's patience, at the Lausanne conference; both were important in shaping the outcome. On still other occasions, such as the drafting of the Aland Island convention, the steady, undramatic negotiatory efforts of professional diplomats accomplished impressive results.

For the purposes of generalization, however, there appear to be at least three aspects of the negotiatory process which merit more extensive discussion: the use of specific diplomatic techniques (point of privilege, reciprocal concession, and ultimative diplomacy); the role of national "principles" or rationalizations; and the conflict of civil-military roles during negotiations.

First, while the negotiatory process naturally varied depending upon whether the issues under discussion were to be imposed or reciprocal, there were substantive differences in each instance. Although delegates of the vanquished Central Powers were barred from the 1919 Peace Conference, the policies and priorities of the Allied were frequently in opposition and thus contested negotiations were held among the victors themselves. In these instances, the decision-making process was based less on compromise than on the exchange of points of privilege, a strategy eventually employed by the French, British and Americans.

The negotiatory procedure involving a point of privilege resulted when one delegate insisted that the issue under contest was so vital to his government that there was no assurance that either its obligations or commitments could be fulfilled if its privilege--i.e. demands--was refused. British negotiatory technique at the Peace Conference, an approach which was more accepted by the French than the Americans, was founded on the assumption that there existed an implicit priority of interest among the powers and that this priority gave a particular country a more decisive voice on that issue than the rest. Therefore, when the normal procedures of compromise failed to protect the vital interests of the priority power, that nation was entitled to make its "decisive voice" felt. Indeed the initial decision to disarm Germany was reached implicitly, as a result of British resort to diplomatic brinkmanship.

Negotiation based upon reciprocity necessarily followed the more traditional diplomatic technique of utilizing mutual compromise. This approach was high-lighted in the negotiations over naval armaments in 1922 where several issues important to rival seapowers became contentious. The American desire to achieve parity with the British was granted only "in principle" as the latter were allowed to keep a larger number and greater tonnage of capital ships. The nonfortification agreement, highly unpopular with American naval officers, stemmed from an effort to appease Japanese concerns over security. Establishment of qualitative



restrictions, too, involved a compromise among the various parties.

Of course, every treaty involving efforts to define mutuality of interest used reciprocal compromise. This negotiatory formula necessarily meant that no signatory would be completely satisfied with the final results, but it is evident that without a willingness to compromise there would have been few arms control accords--beyond those which were imposed. And, finally, a comparison between "points of privilege" and "reciprocal compromise" techniques reveal that highly contentious issues were about equally distributed between imposed and reciprocal treaties, a point that will not surprise students of diplomacy.

Ultimative diplomacy was employed on at least two occasions during the interwar negotiations over arms control provisions: in development of the Anglo-German naval pact; and during the proceedings of the London Naval Conference of 1935-1936. In the former instance, Hitler instructed his delegation--to what was officially billed as a "preliminary conference" on naval questions--that they were to insist upon British acceptance of the basic 100-35 quantitative formula before considering another single issue. This ultimatum left no room for negotiation of the basic proposal: if the British desired to discuss qualitative requirement, which they desperately did, they had no choice but to accept. The Japanese employed the same diplomatic technique during the London naval discussion of 1935-1936 when they announced that they would not participate in the negotiation of other naval questions until the Anglo-Saxon powers first recognize Japan's claim to parity. When Britain and America refused to accept this ultimatum, the Japanese walked out of the conference and thus terminated quantitative limitation among the major seapowers. On both occasions, policy objectives sought through ultimative diplomacy were accomplished. Hitler was seeking to end his diplomatic isolation by creating a political bond with England; he knew that his demand contained provisions far too tempting for London to reject. The Japanese militarists were determined to end what they consider to be a discriminatory, unfavorable ratio system by either obtaining parity or by destroying the system. If they preferred the former alternative, they willingly settled for the latter.

Second, national principles or rationalization frequently forced themselves upon the negotiatory process.

These prejudices--sometimes grounded in a nation's past, sometimes of more recent vintage--were often significant in the fixing of priorities and the determining of policy. Without belaboring this point, three examples of such rationalizations may be shown: the British abhorrence of, and French preference for, conscription; the distaste of submarine and gas warfare; and the use of the "ratio" system in the major naval treaties.

Conscription became a contentious issue between France and England during the negotiations of the Versailles treaty; and the roots of this dispute, however intertwined its branches were in current political needs, were buried in the national heritage of both nations. The British people--and certainly their politicians--were of the opinion that compulsory service fostered militarism and, therefore, was undemocratic. French society, however, had come to look upon conscription, since the Revolution, as a basic tenet of democracy because it distributed the burdens of national service equally. Lloyd George and Marshall Foch were quite explicit in stating their traditional viewpoints when determining the recruitment of the German army. Since the final decision was preempted by Lloyd George's invocation of a point of privilege, British opposition to conscription carried: Germany was to have a "democratic" long-service army, an army that even the British later charged became the cadre of Hitler's legions.

Given the wartime propaganda assault upon the vicious activities of German submarines and the immoral German introduction of "poison" gas, democratic publics, particularly in England and America, expected that both forms of warfare would be outlawed. As military and naval officers (and some political leaders) objected to such extreme measures, neither expectation was fully realized. Yet a five-power treaty establishing specific rules for submarine warfare and outlawing the use of poison or noxious gases was signed in 1922 (although it never went into force), and a series of separate protocols regarding submarine and gas warfare persisted until the Second World War. Both issues became particularly sensitive items politically because of these public attitudes and, consequently, intruded from time to time into arms control deliberations. If this intrusion was not decisive, it was often irritating to the negotiatory process.



Finally, the matter of "ratios" reflects the manner in which a particular concept, once benign, can become a serious obstacle to diplomatic progress. The idea of naval ratios grew out of the unofficial reporting of the Washington conference; at no time did the principals use this concept in their debates. By the 1930s, however, the naval professionals as well as general publics had become accustomed to evaluating sea power in terms of a ratio. American officers gradually fixed on this relative quantitative formula as the essential method of measurement and insisted on using it in the negotiatory process as a guide; the Japanese, however, came to view the ratio as a symbol of Western dominance. In the 1934-1936 negotiations, the Japanese public believed that the ratio was a means by which the Anglo-Saxon powers expressed their national (and racial) superiority. But by this time the Americans had become wedded to the ratio system and this intractability (together with political differences over China) prevented them from seriously exploring new quantitative alternations.

Third, of the many varied factors which determined the political process of negotiating arms control and disarmament agreements, one of the more pervasive aspects was the differences between civil and military viewpoints. These varying attitudes manifest themselves differently at different times, but usually they hovered about the agonizing process of interpreting the vital ingredients of national security. Put crudely, the military and naval professionals usually emphasized the physical requirements of security (i.e., personnel, armaments and bases), while the diplomats and statesmen gave greater importance to the more elusive political aspects of security.

Arms limitation and disarmament had, consequently, far greater appeal to civil leaders than to military professionals. Only in the instance of General Tasker Bliss during the Paris Peace Conference and the British Admiralty during the Anglo-German naval preliminaries, did these professionals take the initiative in urging arms control mechanisms. Bliss found himself alone in advocating extensive, mutual disarmament when the other military chiefs (and civil leaders) were determined to impose such measures only on the vanquished Central Powers. In the instance of the Anglo-German naval pact, British admirals were motivated by a desire to regulate the construction of, and to obtain information about, the forces of a potential foe; their recommendations showed little inclination to further the development of disarmament.

During the negotiatory process, there frequently appeared serious differences between the diplomats formulating political compromises and the military or naval advisors defending particular technical considerations. Prime examples of this clash of viewpoints occurred at the Paris Peace Conference and during the Washington (1922), Geneva (1927), and London (1930) naval deliberations. Indeed, the admirals were roundly chastized after Coolidge's ill-fated 1927 naval conference: it appeared to the public that while Anglo-Saxon statesmen were continually declaring that war between them was unthinkable, the admirals insisted upon planning for it. Someone suggested, somewhat wryly, that this affair was akin to inviting bookmakers and jockeys to abolish horse racing.

Lord Chatfield has tried to explain the advisor's attitude: "It is an unpleasant moment to the technicians when technical interests are being discussed by non-technical people. You feel some compromise may be arrived at which appear to those taking part as reasonable, but in which some vital technical matter may be forgotten, or ignored."<sup>3</sup> As valid as Chatfield's view is, it does not resolve the essential dilemma: in those frequent instances where technical objectives and political objections are in conflict, who is to reconcile them? The advisor or the diplomat? Logic and experience would seem to validate Lord Cecil's conviction that experts should "always be on tap but never on top." It has been impossible to identify a specific political compromise involving arms control provisions which was seriously detrimental to a particular technical consideration. The naval treaties, for example, were frequently criticized on these grounds but the professionals of each country always insisted that the other fellows had gotten the best of it. According to one American naval advisor, "we, as a nation, get the short end of the horn in these conferences when /naval limitation/ agreements are reached."<sup>4</sup> Yet no admiral has been found who suggested that his navy had benefitted from someone else's technical error.

#### Verification and Control

Provisions for enforcement techniques varied enormously among the agreement under study, ranging from treaties containing complex supervisory arrangements and drastic sanctions to pacts avoiding entirely either formal verification or controls. The former groups established

independent supervisory agencies utilizing broad verification powers, while the latter employed more traditional treaty mechanisms, national honor, for compliance.

Evaluation of these various control techniques suggest two fundamental considerations. First, nations formulating the arms agreements studied volunteered little mutual interest in (or concern for) international control machinery. During the protracted discussions over inspection and supervision at Versailles--the initial treaty studied with reference to chronology--the United States and Great Britain rejected the idea of international controls in favor of national responsibility. Only France and its Eastern European allies were enthusiastic about formal supervisory agencies."<sup>5</sup> As France possessed considerable political leverage at Versailles and much less influence in the naval talks, the imposed treaties contained more sophisticated control machinery while the negotiated accords relied largely upon the "good faith" of contracting powers. Second, examination of the treaties indicate little relationship between compliance and verification; that is, a higher degree of compliance does not appear to have been directly related to the employment of more extensive supervisory instruments. Compliance seems to have depended more on whether the basic treaty provisions were imposed or negotiated, on whether the terms reflected concern for national security, and on the signatories respect for national honor.

Formal control machinery can be found, in a descending order of sophistication, in the Versailles treaty (and the similar accords with the lesser vanquished Central Powers), in the Lausanne accord, in the Aland Island treaty, and in the naval agreements. Demilitarization treaties, such as the Russo-Finnish and the Spitsbergen agreements, contained no provisions for formal inspection instruments.

Extensive supervisory powers were employed by the various Inter-Allied Control Commissions charged with disarming the defeated Central Powers in accordance with the imposed peace treaties. Allied air, naval and military commissions, particularly in Germany, subsequently inspected and verified the reduction of that nation's armed forces. In the process, however, the commissions frequently were hampered in that, while they were empowered to verify disarmament activities, they did not possess enforcement powers. Thus the commissions were often unable to compel Weimar authorities to remedy what they considered "violations" of the Versailles

terms; indeed, to seek redress the commission brought their objections initially to the German government and, if no acceptable solution was obtained, forwarded their complaints to the Conference of Ambassadors. The C.A. would attempt to reach a settlement of the disputed issues at the diplomatic level by direct communication with German authorities; but if the treaty "violations" were not remedied to the satisfaction of the Ambassadors their last resort was to recommend to their respective governments the implementation of the sanctions provided for in the Versailles terms--Allied occupation of the German frontier provinces until satisfactory redress was obtained.

The problem of supervision, as experienced under the Versailles treaty, pointed up the dual, often exclusive, nature of controls. Verification consisted of an essentially technical procedure, but enforcement introduced the complicated process of determining guilt and levying punishment, a process that at international levels involved more politics than law. In the case of the Versailles treaty the punishment was often more drastic than some Allied Governments (particularly Britain) thought the violations warranted, thus sanctions were increasingly ignored because of broader political considerations.

The Straits Commission, as provided for in the Lausanne treaty, represented a mixed system of control. Supervision was neither clearly imposed or truly negotiated; that is, the Allies allowed Turkey to adopt (and modify) a control agency that the Turks would never have volunteered to accept. Moreover, the Commission membership consisted of representatives from Great Britain, France, Italy and Turkey (the nation whose waterway was being supervised). Other differences between the Versailles commissions and the Straits Commission were equally marked. The latter had quite limited powers of inspection: it was to verify that the initial terms of the treaty were carried out regarding razing of fortifications and delineating the precise boundaries of demilitarized zones; and it was charged with determining the size of Russia's Black Sea fleet and restricting the entry of foreign warships to a comparable ratio.

Ultimate authority regarding the decisions of the Straits Commission rested with the League of Nations. After supervising the initial phase of demilitarization, the Commission's tasks consisted of observing (but not "inspecting"), gathering information and reporting annually to the League.



The serious disputes that arose between the Commission and the Turkish government over the interpretation of treaty provisions confirmed the restricted nature of the Commission's powers for these differences were forwarded to the League where, invariably, the Turkish view was accepted. The League showed little interest in involving itself in the politics of international supervision.

None of the various naval treaties created formal control agencies; indeed, a study of the negotiations leading to these agreements failed to reveal that such agencies were even considered.<sup>6</sup> The responsibility for fulfillment of these accords rested clearly on the good faith of the signatories and, traditionally, such an arrangement violation of treaty provision by one signatory immediately released, upon detection, the other parties. The control instrument of the Washington naval treaty (1922), however, did elaborate on methods of coping with situations where inequalities might arise. Article XXI stated that "If during the term of the present Treaty the requirements of the national security of any Contracting Power in respect of naval defense are, in the opinion of that Power, materially affected by any change of circumstances, the Contracting Powers will, at the request of such Power, meet in conference with a view to the reconsideration of the provisions of the Treaty and its amendment by mutual agreement." Moreover, the article continued, "In view of possible technical and scientific developments, the United States, after consultation with the other Powers, shall arrange for a conference of all the Contracting Powers which shall convene as soon as possible after the expiration of eight years from the coming into force of the present Treaty to consider what changes, if any, in the Treaty may be necessary to meet such developments."

The London treaty (1936) expanded the system of naval controls by providing for the annual exchange of detailed information concerning building and modernization programs and by embodying a general "escape clause" or "escalator clause" which protected the signatories from excessive building by nations not bound by the pact. The provisions for exchange of information called for each signatory to confidentially report his "annual programme for the construction and acquisition of all vessels" in accordance with the formula contained in Article 12. Additionally, a separate appendix was to be forwarded containing the technical particulars, such as tonnage, armaments, speed, etc., of each new ship no later than four months before the laying of

the keel. (The Anglo-German Pact of 1935 also provided for a continuing mutual exchange of naval information.) The escape clause provided that a contracting nation could abandon any painful treaty restrictions three months after notifying the other signatories.

With no formal arrangements made to provide for verification, the naval powers apparently planned to utilize the services of their naval attaches.<sup>7</sup> Judging from the lack of objection--except perhaps from the attaches themselves--the various Admiralties appear to have been satisfied with the accumulated results of their intelligence sources. With one exception, these naval officers rarely complained about a lack of information to judge compliance of the treaty provisions. This single exception centered American fears that the Japanese were "fortifying" their Pacific mandated island (contrary to Article XIX of the Washington naval treaty) during the late 1920s and 1930s. As no naval observers, and only a few civilians, were allowed to tour these islands American naval and military officers--after initially scorning any "inspection" system--gradually came to desire a more fully-developed verification process.

Demilitarization agreements contained several different procedures for verification and control. Indeed, with the exception of the Aland Island convention and the Lausanne treaty which demilitarized Western Thrace these treaties tended to be self-enforcing. While the delegates who discussed the Aland Island settlement did not consider verification procedures, they did create provisions for guarantees and enforcement. The Council of the League of Nations was empowered to decide upon enforcement procedures when a complaint was brought before it concerning a possible evasion. Any League member could bring forth a charge of violations but the Council was free to decide what action if any it might choose to take, and this decision was to be based on the findings of a majority of its members. Although the idea of inspection was discussed during the negotiations on the demilitarization of Western Thrace, the principle was rejected. Instead, a "bordering Power"--Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria, but not the signatories--could file a complaint of noncompliance with the League Council. The Council had, presumably, the right to order an investigation of the charges.

The agreements which demilitarized Spitsbergen, the Aegean Islands and stipulated zones of Russia and Finland were completely self-enforcing. As no special machinery for

inspection, control or enforcement was provided, the countries involved assumed the responsibilities for the execution of their particular obligations.

Careful examination of all factors, regarding the treaties under consideration, failed to reveal any meaningful relationship between supervision and compliance. It is true that the evidence submitted above would seem to indicate that an inverse ratio existed between those treaties utilizing a complex control system and the number of violations detected. That is, treaties employing a sophisticated system of inspection were more often violated than those agreements which left the matter of compliance to national integrity. The Versailles treaty, consequently, was plagued with far more violations than the Russo-Finnish pact or the naval agreements. However, the determining factor in this relationship was neither controls nor compliance but the manner in which the agreement was arranged: if it was imposed, violations occurred; if it was mutually negotiated, it was relatively free of violations.

#### Compliance and Revision

With compliance and revision, as with other general factors regarding the treaties under study, it is difficult to find a reliable pattern. On the whole, nations committed to uphold specific arms control provisions appear to have complied with their obligations. The most serious breaches of these commitments occurred with the imposed treaties (i.e., the German and Turkish armistices and the Versailles accord) and the submarine protocol. Where mutuality of interest existed, (i.e., the various naval pacts and demilitarization agreements), arms control mechanism incurred few evasions. Attempts to seek revision of provisions met with varying responses: with the Versailles treaty it failed outright; with the Washington naval system it produced (in the London pacts of 1930 and 1936) only temporary compromises; with the Lausanne agreement regarding the Straits it resulted in a complete reorientation of the treaty at Montreux.

Isolated under more specific examination at least four relevant considerations appear warranted. First, there existed a high degree of compliance among arms control agreements regardless of whether they dealt with geographic

Demilitarization or arms limitation. Investigation of the Russo-Finnish, Spitsbergen, Aland Island and Lausanne conventions failed to unearth any evidence of noncompliance. Similarly, the naval treaties of Washington (1922) and London (1930) and (1935), the Anglo-German pact, and the Turko-Greek and Turko-Soviet protocols appear to have been honored by their signatories.

Charges or rumors of noncompliance were levied, nevertheless, against certain of these agreements. The Germans were indicted at Nuremberg for alleged violations of their pact with the British by constructing more submarines than allowed and by building capital ships with a displacement in excess of agreed limits. German Admirals Eric Raeder and Karl Doenitz were indicted, but not convicted, at the Nuremberg trials for violating the submarine code. Evidence, however, did not corroborate these charges. Rumors were rampant in the late 1920s and 1930s that the Japanese were evading their obligations not to build fortifications or military installations in their Central Pacific mandated islands. Examination of Japanese records did not substantiate these suspicions. Finally, there were a few reports that the Turks were violating their pledges to keep the Straits demilitarized, but again these allegations have not been supported.

Second, it may be argued that even those treaties most consistently violated did not result in any preceptive breach of security or in any sudden upset of the balance of power. Surely this was true of the German, Hungarian and Turkish armistices, the Versailles treaty and the submarine protocol. Moreover, examination of the actual violations indicate that so many different factors were involved that any unequivocal judgment regarding their characteristics is hazardous.

Although numerous violations of individual provisions of the Armistices occurred, through omission and commission, they resulted from a breakdown in governmental control due to anarchy, from a feeling of outraged dignity at what the vanquished statesmen felt to be unjust interpretations of armistice provisions, or from a drastic change in the political-military situation not in keeping with the spirit of the armistice. The Germans failed to meet the military and naval conditions of their November 11 armistice: they did not turn over all the weapons and transportation required, and they scuttled their interned warships. Yet as



the Allies possessed overwhelming armed forces in the field and could, upon sufficient provocation, impose severe military sanctions upon the disintegrating German army the more significant violations were ultimately corrected. However annoying the scuttling of the German fleet might have been, this action did nothing to enhance German power. Consequently, despite German evasions of the Armistice terms the Allies immediate military and political position were so enhanced by the agreement as to guarantee them victory. Turkey and Hungary violated their armistices to the extent of rearming to expel what they took to be unwarranted "invasions" of their territory. Thus while the Allies were unable to dictate the kind of peace settlement they initially desired for Turkey, neither of these two errant nations were capable of militarily resisting the major Allied powers if the latter had wished to impose military sanctions. Each of the latter two armistice violations, therefore, could be characterized as defensive.

That the postwar Germans were guilty of numerous breaches of their arms control obligations can not be seriously questioned. The Versailles restrictions on personnel and weapons were, in some instances systematically, evaded; yet as late as 1930 this noncompliance could scarcely be taken as impairing the actual security of the former Allies. Nor were the Allies unaware of these evasions; indeed, the reports of the Inter-Allied Control Commissions and the estimates of the military attaches seem to have measured these violations with remarkable accuracy. Consequently, when Germany began an extensive rearmament program in the mid-1930s this action did not result in any sudden dislocation of the European power equilibrium.

The submarine protocol of 1936 fell victim to military strategy at the very moment it became operative. Naval officers in both Germany and the United States constituted the protocol's most severe opponents. Germany gradually moved to abrogate the restrictions on submarine warfare, at the urging of its naval staff, as it sought to blockade the British Isles. The United States dismissed the protocol on the first day of the war in order to make the fullest use of its submarines against Japan's long lines of communication. While Japan did not systematically employ its submarines against Allied merchant shipping, the protocol was not a decisive factor in determining Japan's policy. The decision to ignore the submarine protocol was dictated by the requirements of naval strategy.

Third, the psychological implications of noncompliance, actual or suspected, were of considerable significance. If the German violations of the 1920s did not directly or immediately impair French security, they did serve to convince Paris officials and their countrymen of what they already suspected: the Germans were treacherous, untrustworthy, and unrepentant. French intelligence, indeed, consistently over-estimated the quantity and quality of these violations which tended to inhibit French diplomacy, up to 1935, regarding the possibility of revising the Versailles treaty. In turn, this intractability served only to increase Franco-German hostility.

In at least one instance where grounds existed for charges of possible treaty evasion, the psychological impact of such accusations had wide repercussions. There can be little doubt but that American officials, given Japan's aggressiveness in the Western Pacific, came to believe in the late 1920s and 1930s that the latter were acting in secret to evade their pledge not to fortify the mandated islands. This conviction aided in conditioning the Americans to regard the Japanese as unlikely to honor any treaty commitments--witness the United States instant abrogation of the submarine protocol.

Fourth, although most of the agreements provided for treaty revision, attempts to implement this process did not usually result in expansion of arms control restrictions. In each instance where revision became an issue, these post-treaty appeals were channeled through the normal diplomatic processes and resulted usually in a "grievance" hearing at a formal conference. While few of the treaties possessed the potential for a growth factor, the issues prompting revision had frequently been evident at the signing of the initial agreement.

German efforts to secure revisions to the Versailles treaty, lengthy and often heated, ended with the abrogation of the entire formula. By initially registering their objections, formally and informally, to its stringent military restrictions and by frequently asking for revisions during the 1920s the Germans had sought to expand the quantitative limits (more personnel and weapons) and relax the qualitative prohibitions (allowing the use of aircraft, armored vehicles and artillery). The inability of diplomacy to achieve a compromise that either would allow Germany to build to parity with the other major European powers or would reduce the armed forces of the former Allied nations to

Germany's levels resulted in a deadlock broken only by Hitler's unilateral renunciation of the entire system. England's subsequent negotiation of a naval pact with the Third Reich was not treaty revisionism, it was a salvage operation.

Turkey's successful revision of the Lausanne convention ended the demilitarization of the Straits and provided for the rebuilding of fortifications along that important waterway. Never happy with the demilitarization restrictions, the Turks used the spirit of revisionism that was driving European politics in the mid-1930s to justify their demands. After pressing their desires from 1932, the Turks announced--with a delicate hint of unilateral action if diplomacy again failed--that they wished to discuss the remilitarization of the Straits. At Montreux, in 1936, Turkish wishes were honored and diplomatic procedures were followed but demilitarization there legally came to an end.

In the major naval treaties, revisionism traveled full circle: the London pact of 1930 represented a considerable expansion of arms control measures over the basic Washington agreement (1922), but the second London accord six years later witnessed the virtual termination of the original naval limitation system. In the first instance, the full growth potential of naval limitation was met with more than 70 per cent of warships of Great Britain, the United States and Japan brought under control. However, amidst political unrest in Asia, the Washington naval system lapsed, although diplomatic procedures were applied, before the demands of Japan for parity.

It would appear that opportunities for development and application of arms control measures existed until the early 1930s. From this point on the general mood of revisionism became negative and swung against the employment of these devices as aggressive national ambitions clashed with the demand of security.

#### Arms Control and Security

Arms control and disarmament techniques were, of course, intimately related to the problems of national security. Although this relationship was not always articulated, the justification for these techniques stemmed from the belief that control of armaments would enhance security

by lessening political tensions.

An examination of the relationships between arms control and disarmament agreements and the needs of national security suggests at least three considerations. First, arms control concepts did, employed as technical and political instruments, ease tensions among nations. As technical devices, they assisted in reducing apprehensions toward potential military threats and thus had a salutary effect upon the solution of more general problems; as political instruments, these arms control techniques were used when armaments themselves became contentious issues in international politics.

Geographic demilitarization was most frequently employed in the technical sense. In the Russo-Finnish treaty the most contested issues arose from territorial disputes; demilitarization aided in their solution by allowing Finland's more legitimate territorial claims without jeopardizing Russia's vital security interests. The Lausanne convention utilized demilitarization in a like manner: (1) it allowed for justice to Turkish and Greek territorial claims regarding Thrace and the Aegean Islands without impairing the security of either; (2) it provided the Allies (particularly England, France and Italy) with ready access to the Black Sea without denying Turkish sovereignty over the Straits; and (3) it partially appeased the Soviets by limiting the introduction of non-littoral warships into the Black Sea. Demilitarization of Spitsbergen and Aland Island also performed an essentially technical function: it made more palatable in each instance the political decisions regarding possession. Norway retained control of Spitsbergen and Finland regained possession of Aland; in both cases, however, the other contestants for ownership were assured that neither territory would be used as military bases against them.

When competition in armaments created tensions among nations, weapons themselves assumed a distinct political dimension. Arms limitation agreements were employed on such occasions as political devices to lessen anxieties and stabilize the current balance of powers. Naval armaments were dealt with as major political issues in the Washington and London (1930) treaties, in the Turko-Greek and Turko-Soviet protocols, in the Anglo-German pact, and in the submarine rules of warfare. The military restrictions of the Versailles treaty also may be classified with this group

In each instance, the concept of arms control was put forward directly as a matter of national policy and, in each case, agreement on arms control was reached deliberately with the realization that it might affect national security. While it was evident that long-standing issues (i.e., nationalism, irredentism, imperialism, etc.) formed the initial premise for the construction of armaments, the impending arms races assumed, in each case, almost equal significance in their own right as issues of political contention.

With the exception of the treaties imposed upon the defeated Central Powers, the arms control agreements, whether used as technical or political instruments, did succeed in an immediate relaxation of tensions between the participating nations.

Second, the balance of power was variously affected by the arms control treaties employed between 1919 and 1939. Where mutuality of interest prevailed the power equilibrium was little changed; however, where such consideration gave way to imposed obligations the immediate effect was a substantive alteration in normal power relationships. The Russo-Finnish treaty could hardly be said to have altered greatly the Baltic balance of power; the USSR's overwhelming military potential still meant that, given sufficient desire or provocation, Russian power would be irresistible. In the cases of the imposed treaties, where no mutuality of interest prevailed, the power equilibrium of Central and Eastern Europe was greatly affected. Enforcement of the Versailles treaty, for example, meant that the continental balance was tipped in favor of the victors, particularly France and Italy, and the new states of Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The Versailles military restrictions were a monument to France's determined effort to achieve as near as it possibly could, absolute security. It has been argued that the victors' failure to enforce these restrictions in the 1930s undermined French security; it might also be noted that France's stubborn insistence upon absolute, as opposed to relative, security denied mutuality of interest and that this factor was preeminent in the ultimate overthrow of the Versailles treaty.

Although it was popular in naval circles of the major seapowers to argue that the Washington naval system altered the balance of power, in retrospect such does not seem to have been the case. Certainly, the naval treaties of 1922 and 1930 rejected the idea of absolute security in favor of relative security and, yes, such a compromise held within it an element of risk; but to obtain a negotiated settlement, which necessarily involves mutual considerations, security could only have been established in a relative sense. Probably the only factor, up to the mid-1930s, which had any significant impact on the naval equilibrium in the Far East was the United States' failure to promptly build up to treaty; this deplorable situation, however, could hardly be laid to the arms control instruments themselves. Indeed, it might better be argued that, given American reluctance to build, the "naval gap" might have been much wider without the limits applied to Japanese construction. The concept of relative security may have been introduced prematurely but surely any future, broadly-gauged arms limitation and reduction policy will have to accept the same risks.

And third, even though arms control techniques did succeed in the immediate reduction of international friction, these devices were not adequate to prevent future crises which led to World War Two. That is, these techniques could not--nor is likely they ever will--successfully overcome, by themselves, all the fundamental, long-range political and psychological factors which conditioned national security.

That arms control agreements failed to prevent war does not necessarily mean that these measures were either purposeless or dangerous. The Russians tossed aside their bargain with the Finns in 1939, but the Greeks and Turks continued to make their demilitarization pact work. The Washington naval system and the Versailles treaty were discarded along the road to war, but other arms limitation pacts--the Turko-Greek and Turko-Soviet protocols--continued to function. Since geographic demilitarization and arms limitation accords seem to have met similar fates, the critical question then becomes evident: what role if any did arms control techniques play in keeping the peace or in starting the war?

As the treaties under study, except the imposed ones, did not upset power equilibriums it can hardly be argued that they seriously endangered national security. If



insecurity moved Russia to attack Finland in 1939, this attitude stemmed from the growth of German power in the Baltic; it did not come from a failure of demilitarization. If France's sense of security vis-a-vis Germany lessened drastically after 1935, it was due less to imperfections of the Versailles treaty than to the lack of French (and British) will to employ League sanctions or to take adequate measures to maintain a power balance. If the United States found itself in a militarily inferior position in the Far East during 1941, this was hardly due to the long deceased "non-fortification" pledge or to restrictions on naval construction, rather it signified America's refusal to build the installations and warships (as well as political policies) demanded by new Asian circumstances. Long before war came to Europe and Asia the major arms control devices had been mutilated by rising ambitions.

Proponents of arms control tended to expect too much from the application of these devices, while opponents usually decried the possibility that they could provide any meaningful benefits. Neither faction, however, seemed prepared to accept the agreements for what they really were--treaties registering a temporary, first-step toward more stable relations among nations. Rather than permanent guarantees, these treaties were like seedlings: they required constant attention, much cultivation, occasional grafting for new vitality, and even then some might have died because they were too frail.

When considering the psychological implications of arms control and security, one is reminded of H.A.L. Fisher's observation that "In reality, security is a state of mind; so is insecurity." Perhaps no single example demonstrates this point better than the French and the Versailles treaty. During the 1920s when Germany was under most stringent military restrictions, France possessed--by any standard--an overwhelming army and air force. Yet French fears and distrust of Germany, which often seemed to border on the pathological, resulted in the French government's consistent over-estimation of the amount and importance of German violations of its disarmament obligations. This climate seriously impaired the political relationships between the two governments and stimulated an aggressive nationalism in Germany; whether or not earlier French concessions to the Weimar government would have stemmed the tide will never be known. Yet as the record stands, surely this experience must stand out as a classic working of "the self-fulfilling prophecy."

Chapter 21 -- Footnotes

1. George V. Fagan, "F.D.R. and Naval Limitation," United States Naval Institute Proceedings (April, 1955), p. 413.
2. Lord Chatfield, It Might Happen Again (1947), p. 44.
3. Ibid., p. 5.
4. Henry A. Wiley, An Admiral From Texas (1934) p. 270.
5. It should be noted, however, that concern with supervision and controls was prevalent in the League's debates on general disarmament between world wars. See, Richard Dean Burns, "Origins of the United States' Inspection Policy: 1926-46," Disarmament and Arms Control (London) II (Spring, 1964) and his essay, "International Arms Inspection Policies Between World Wars, 1919-1934," The Historian (1968)
6. These basic agreements include the Washington treaty (1922), the London treaties (1930, 1936), the Anglo-German pact (1935), the Turko-Greek protocol (1930), and the Turko-Soviet protocol (1931).
7. Alfred Vagts, The Military Attache (1967) devotes a chapter to the "Attaches and the Limitation of Armaments" without shedding any light on the problems of the naval attaches as control agents for the naval treaties.



INDEX

**Aerial:** armistice, I: 11, 15, 19; Versailles restrictions, I: 158, 164ff, 202-03, 206-07, 218-19, 232ff; II: 187; III: 232; Austrian treaty, I: 93, 102ff; Hungarian treaty, I: 108-09; Bulgarian treaty, I: 110; Article 8, I: 129-30; Soviet-Finnish treaty, II: 21; Spitsbergen, II: 34; Aland Island, II: 37, 54ff; Turkey, II: 84, 123, 135, 139; III: 177; Washington treaty, III: 21.

**Attaches:** I: 44, 194-95, 196-7, 206; II: 39; IV: 15ff

**Austria:** armistice, I: 1, 6, 16; peace treaty, I: 87ff.

**Balance of Power:** I: 98, 125; II: 33, 103; III: 186; evaluation of, IV: 21, 21ff.

**Bolshevism:** I: 96-7; II: 3ff, 4, 68.

**Bulgaria:** armistice, I: 1, 6, 16, 21; peace treaty, I: 87ff; II: 78.

**Civil-Military Differences:** Versailles, I: 29ff, 158, 170ff; Austria, I: 93; Bulgaria, I: 112-13; (see ch. 14) III: 86ff, 104, 137ff; IV: 15.

**Chemical Warfare:** I: 51, 93, 108-109, 109-110, 197, 198-99, 203-04, 219-220; III: 1, 129.

**Cobb-Lippmann Commentary:** I: 5, 137.

**Commissions:** (see III: 15ff) Interallied Control Commissions, I: 29, 45, 52-53, 87, 104ff, 107-08, 154ff; Permanent International Armistice Commission, I: 18ff; Commission of Jurists, II: 44; Straits Commission, II: 94, 106, 112ff, 125, 127, 139.

**Committee of Guarantee:** I: 166.

Compulsory Military Service: armistice, I: 3; Versailles treaty, I: 28, 39ff, 47, 51, 158; Austria treaty, I: 91ff; Bulgaria treaty, I: 113-14; Article 8, I: 120-21, 128ff, 133-34, 135-36.

Conference of Ambassadors: I: 157ff, 181, 193ff.

Czechoslovakia: I: 94-96, 106-7, 217-18.

Defortification: I: 51; differences from demilitarization, I: 62; II: 29, 33, 46, 54.

Demilitarization: armistice, I: 16; Versailles treaty, I: 28-29, 46, 59ff; Hungarian treaty, I: 108-09; Russo-Finnish pact, II: 2, 9, 19ff; Spitsbergen & Aland islands, II: 28-29, 32ff, 36ff, 54ff; Turkey, II: 64ff, 81ff, 85ff, 122; Washington naval treaty, III: 19ff, 69ff.

Demobilization: I: 17, 33, 90-91, 103-04; II: 66.

Denmark: (see Aland Island dispute) naval accord, III: 214.

Destruction of Arms: Austrian treaty, I: 101ff; Versailles treaty, II: 156, 161; Washington naval treaty, III: 30ff.

Economics, Disarmament and: I: 36, 73, 91; II: 73; III: 5-6, 17, 93, 138; use as sanction, I: 32; II: 73.

Enforcement: I: 207ff; II: 49, 124; III: 33, 133, 188; IV: 15ff domestic role in, I: 191; II: 73; international methods, I: 122; II: 32ff, 38, 50ff, 70, 84, 95, 124; self-enforcing treaties, II: 35, 88; III: 33.

Escape Clauses: II: 103; III: 125, 234, 237, 268ff.

Estonia: II: 8ff, 47.

Evasion: (see chs. 6 & 7) armistices, I: 17ff; III: 174ff; charges of, II: 22, 57, 128-129; III: 134ff, 208, 249, IV: 21; concealment from inspection, I: 125-6, 160-61, 175ff; lack of, II: 2, 22, 39, 128; III: 165; techniques, I: 160; evaluation, IV: 20ff.

Export of arms: I: 93, 110, 127, 130-1, 133-4, 191.

Finland: (see chs. 9 & 10) naval accord, III: 214.

Fourteen Points: I: 1, 3, 7, 12, 125; II: 65; Point Two, I: 5; Point Four, I: 3-5, 125; Cobb-Lippmann commentary, I: 5, 137.

Fortifications: (see Defortifications & Demilitarization)  
I: 47, 51, 59ff, 107, 156, 163, 191; II: 22, 37, 84, 104; Japanese mandates, III: 18, 19ff, 70ff, 224, 249.

Gas Warfare: (See chemical warfare)

Greece: I: 95-96; II: 71, 79, 115; (see Turko-Greek Naval protocol, III: 165).

Guarantees: I: 8, 32, 36, 65, 69-70, 98, 122, 141-143;  
II: 38, 50ff, 70, 73, 84, 95, 102, 110, 117-118;  
III: 105, 108 (see Committee of Guarantee).

Hungary: armistice, I: 1, 16, 21; peace treaty, I: 87ff.

Inspection: (see Attaches); I: 6, 38, 127ff; II: 54, 94, 102, 118, 126; III: 249ff; arguments for, I: 43ff, 121-122, 128-29, 137ff; 145-46; II: 84; III: 188; commissions, I: 6, 43ff, 52-53, 87, 104ff; effectiveness of, (see chs. 6 & 7) II: 127; III: 249ff; evasions (see Evasions); objections to, I: 44, 130, 137ff; II: 83; mutual exchange of information, III: 195, 234, 237; evaluation, IV: 15.

International Military Force: I: 137ff.

Latvia: II: 9, 47.

Lithuania: II: 9.

Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact: III: 87ff, 107, 118.

Military Personnel: Versailles treaty, I: 31ff, 39ff, 50ff, 159, 163ff, 197, 204, 212ff; Austrian treaty, I: 89ff; Hungary treaty, I: 106-108; Bulgarian treaty, I: 110-111; Article 8, I: 130; Turkey, II: 101.

Military Training: I: 51, 92, 163.

Naval Limitation: surrender of German navy, I: 11ff, 15, 17, 20; Versailles treaty, I: 46ff, 52, 61-62, 78ff, 158, 164ff, 219-20, 223ff; Austrian treaty, I: 89, 102ff;

Hungarian treaty, I: 108; Bulgarian treaty, I: 110-111; Russo-Finnish treaty, II: 21; Spitzbergen, II: 34-35; Aland Island, II: 37, 54ff; Turkey, II: 96, 112, 125ff; (see chs. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20).

Negotiations: armistice, I: 9, 11; Versailles treaty, I: 29, 32ff, 62-63; Austrian treaty, I: 89; Article 8, I: 118-19, 123-24; Russo-Finnish treaty, II: 1-2, 7, 15ff; Spitsbergen & Aland Island, II: 32ff, 38ff; Turkey, II: 65-66, 74ff, 131, 135; Washington treaty, III: 12ff; London (1939) treaty, III: 89ff; Anglo-German, III: 190ff; Franco-Italian, III: 155ff; Turko-Greek, III: 165ff; Turko-Soviet, III: 170ff; London (1936) treaty, III: 219ff; evaluation, IV: 10.

Neutral Zones: (see Demilitarization) I: 10, 14; II: 36, 66, 74, 82.

Norway: (see Spitsbergen, II: 29); naval accord, III: 214.

Opinion, Arms Control and: (see ch. 14); I: 132-33, III: 110, 137ff, 198; IV: 7.

Ordinance, Restrictions on: armistice, I: 7ff, 15, 19; Versailles treaty, I: 50ff, 158; Austrian treaty, I: 93; Spitsbergen, II: 34ff; Aland Island, evaluation of Versailles, I: 217ff; II: 54; Russo-Finnish treaty, II: 15ff; Washington naval treaty, III: 30ff; London (1930) treaty, III: 122ff; London (1936) treaty, III: 234.

Outlawing of Weapons: I: 50ff, 93, 103-04 (see Submarine).

Politics, Arms Control and: I: 2ff; II: 22; Aland Island, II: 38, 41ff, 55ff; Washington naval treaty, III: 8 (see ch. 14); London (1930) treaty, III: 104, 110, 137ff; London (1936) treaty, III: 238; Anglo-German pact, III: 186ff; Turko-Greek naval protocol, III, 170ff.

Poland: I: 95-96, 177, 202-03, 212; II: 46; (see Aland Island naval accord, III: 214.)

Production Restrictions: Versailles, I: 32, 50, 156, 163, 171, 184, 196-97, 207-208, 213-214ff; Austrian treaty, I: 93; Hungarian treaty, I: 108-09; Article 8, I: 120, 127ff, 143-44ff; Aland Islands, II: 37. (see restrictions imposed in naval treaties, Ch. 13, 16, 18, 19.)

Railways: I: 7ff, 15, 19-20; II: 70, 109.

Rearmament: I: 202-3; II: 104; III: 175, 217-218; escape clauses, III: 125, 268ff; negotiations for, II: 131; III: 227; unilateral abrogation, I: 202-03; II: 132; III: 186; evaluation, IV: 20ff.

Research: I: 197-98, 200, 205, 218ff.

Revision of Treaties: I: 16, 147-48, 202-03, 210; II: 56ff; III: 94-5; evaluation, IV: 20ff.

Rumania: I: 95-96; II: 72.

Sanctions: armistice, I: 8; Versailles treaty, I: 32, 36, 173, 210-11; Rhineland, I: 70; Article 8, I: 143.

Soviet Union: I: 97-8, 177, 201, 219-20; Russo-Finnish treaty (see Ch 8); Aland Island, II: 35-36, 40, 59; Straits convention, II: 93-94, 96, 99, 127, 135; Turko-Greek naval protocol, III: 170ff; naval accession protocol, III: 214, 236, 240ff.

Submarines: armistice, I: 8, 11, 16, 20; Versailles treaty, I: 46ff; Austrian treaty, I: 102ff; Spitsbergen, II: 30, 34-35; Russo-Finnish treaty, II: 21; Washington naval treaty, III: 26ff; Anglo-German pact, III: 190; submarine rules of warfare, III: 126; IV: 22.

Sweden: Aland Island, II: 35ff; III: 214.

Tanks: I: 93, 130, 158, 197-8, 200, 219, 220.

Technical advisors: III: 86, 89; evaluation of, IV: 14, 15.

Turkey: armistice, I: 1, 16, 22; straits & demilitarization, chs. 10-11, 12; naval protocols, ch. 17.

Verification: (see Inspection).

Violations of Arms Control Terms: (see Evasions); German armistice, I: 17ff; Hungary, I: 21-22; Turkey, I: 22; evaluation of, IV: 20ff.

Yugoslavia: I: 95-96, 106-07.